The Study of Strategic and Extensive form of Noncooperative Game Theory

S.M.Chithra; V.Vinoba

doi:https://doi.org/10.14445/22315373/IJMTT-V22P505

International Journal of Mathematics Trends and Technology

Research Article | Open Access | Download PDF

Volume 22 | Number 2 | Year 2015 | Article Id. IJMTT-V22P505 | DOI : https://doi.org/10.14445/22315373/IJMTT-V22P505

The Study of Strategic and Extensive form of Noncooperative Game Theory

S.M.Chithra, V.Vinoba

Citation :

S.M.Chithra, V.Vinoba, "The Study of Strategic and Extensive form of Noncooperative Game Theory," International Journal of Mathematics Trends and Technology (IJMTT), vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 25-31, 2015. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.14445/22315373/IJMTT-V22P505

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a wide range of widelystudied models strategic form behavioural game theory. It is standard multi agent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies. This paper gives a brief overview of game theory. Therefore in the first section we want to outline what game theory generally is and where it is applied. In the next section, we introduce some of the most important terms of Non-cooperative game theory such as strategic form (or) normal form games, extensive form and Nash equilibrium.

Keywords

Game theory, strategic form, extensive form, Nash equilibrium.

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